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Abstract
International donors got involved in the Western Balkans during the last two decades, 
mainly through civil society organisations (CSOs), with the initial aim of providing emer-
gency relief, and then to promote democracy and broadly support the Europeanization 
agenda. The intention has also been to contribute to the spread of western values and 
norms, as well as advance notions of ‘good governance’ and state reform. However, most 
local CSOs in receipt of such assistance have not developed high capacities and remain 
dependent on donor funding. They are also vulnerable to political pressures and have 
become detached from their local constituencies. Through a survey of donors that have 
operated across the region, this article seeks to examine why the long-term provision of aid 
and attempts to promote democracy via civil society have seemingly not delivered a 
sufficient dividend. What is examined here is whether donor conceptualization of ‘civil 
society development’ is the critical variable determining success. If we acknowledge that 
how donors view civil society and its contribution to democracy and state building is the 
basis from which aid is provided, projects are supported, and objectives set and measured, 
then better understanding the donors’ perspective is an important basis for trying to under-
stand limited success. This, combined with poor co-ordination and collaboration amongst 
donors and between them and local stakeholders, arguably compounds the problem. 
The article concludes that although it has long been recognised that donor strategies are 
contentious and determine the impact of assistance, the economic crisis is exerting a signifi-
cant impact in terms of priorities, exit strategies and co-ordination, the outcome of which is 
by no means certain.
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Introduction: Donors in the Western Balkans – From Emergency  
Aid to Democracy Promotion
International donor involvement in the Western Balkans1 began two 
decades ago in response to the rapid and often violent transitions in 
the region from authoritarian socialist regimes to states gradually develop-
ing political and economic systems similar to their neighbours in Western 
Europe. As was the case elsewhere across Eastern Europe and the former 
USSR, much of the aid was channelled through civil society (or what was 
deemed to represent a fledgling civil society in countries with little or no 
experience of such activity or its institutions). International donors became 
involved in an attempt to consolidate as well as induce change, but also to 
spread western values and facilitate the integration of the region within 
European and global structures. During this period there have been numer-
ous attempts to co-ordinate the activities of the numerous international 
donor agencies, private foundations and bi-lateral donors that operate in 
the region, with the aim both of maximizing the value of aid, and of ensur-
ing sustainable exit strategies and long-term impact.
With donor activities increasingly directed to other parts of the world 
(in particular the Middle East and north Africa), and the global financial 
crisis triggering the most profound rationalization of donor funding and 
priorities, democracy promotion and the development of civil society in 
the Western Balkans is under immense pressure and scrutiny, both for its 
predictive power and in terms of ‘lessons to be learnt.’ At a practical level, 
the limited and much reduced funds that remain available to the region 
have to be used carefully and targeted effectively. At this critical time, as 
never before, it is important to take stock of the past and current strategies: 
to review the practices and priorities of international donors, identify what 
has worked and what has failed, and offer recommendations for effective 
leadership and deployment in the (long) period leading up to EU enlarge-
ment. Donors, investors, local civil society activists, as well as the academic 
community each require strategies for improving the current situation in 
order to foster the long-term sustainability of the civil society sector in the 
Western Balkans.
1) Used here to refer to Albania and the countries that were formerly part of Yugoslavia – 
though not Slovenia, which has been an EU member since 2004.
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This research does not set out to measure or evaluate the impact of 
donor assistance or the performance of recipient CSOs. Rather, the aim 
here is to examine the substance and framing of the assistance being 
provided and to tentatively posit that this is potentially an important inde-
pendent variable that has been hitherto under-researched within the exist-
ing literature. Based on the assertion that how donors view civil society and 
its contribution to democracy is likely to determine how aid is provided, 
which type of projects are supported, and the objectives set and measured, 
then better understanding the donors’ perspective is an important basis 
for trying to understand limited success, and for potentially remedying 
past failures. The research is also interested in the behavior of donors, in 
particular their interaction with each other and their modes of communi-
cation and co-operation. Poor co-ordination has been identified in the 
existing literature as a key factor limiting the overall impact of external aid 
in the Balkans and elsewhere (Riddell 2006).
Thus, where this article seeks to extend and develop existing knowledge 
of civil society development and donor engagement is by focusing much 
more closely on the perceptions and behavior of donors, rather than assess-
ing impact or measuring the capacities of recipients of aid. In other words, 
this research is primarily input -rather than output- focused.
A Conceptual Framework for Studying Donor Support for Civil Society
The existing literature on civil society development and donor engagement 
presents a difficult conundrum: civil society needs to be supported, but the 
success of donor-driven initiatives to do so have realised limited success. 
We are reminded, by a host of scholars researching the post-communist 
region from within various academic disciplines (see in particular Mandel 
2002; Wedel 2001; Cellarius and Staddon 2002; Sampson 1996, Quigley 2000), 
that despite the extensive efforts of foreign donors, individual participation 
and involvement in civic associations is found to be low and in some cases 
lower than in post-authoritarian regimes elsewhere in the world (Petrova 
and Tarrow 2007: 76). Study after study has concluded that post-socialist 
civil society is weak (Howard 2003; Crotty 2003; Rose 2001; Raiser, Haerpfer, 
Nowotny and Wallace 2001).
Not surprisingly, perhaps, most multi-lateral and bi-lateral donor agen-
cies intent on supporting progressive change and ‘transition’ continue to 
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channel their assistance through NGOs or CSOs, despite evidence of 
limited success and modest progress. This is in large part a consequence of 
the influence of USAID and other bi-lateral American donors who have, 
since the second part of the 1990s if not before, streamed the bulk of their 
development aid through American-style advocacy NGOs. Whilst the 
impact and extent of such aid has tended to be exaggerated (Mendelson 
and Glenn 2002), professional NGOs/CSOs competing for externally funded 
donor projects have become a ubiquitous and almost generic feature of 
post-socialism. The overall momentum is extensive and, for critics, perva-
sive (Quigley 2000; Wedel 2001). The tier of professional organisations mas-
querading as civil society in urban locations across the post-socialist world, 
and the donors on which they depend for their revenue, have been criti-
cised for wasting resources, duplicating projects and initiatives, failing 
to engage with communities and local campaign agendas, and generally 
being temporary constructions that are neither accountable, legitimate nor 
particularly sustainable (Sampson 2002).
Although the strategy of supporting NGOs is now eponymous with 
international donor aid, it was not ever thus. In the early 1990s, donors 
initially provided institutional support for political party development and 
reform of state institutions. The shift towards civil society development 
coincided with the Clinton presidency and occurred in large part due to 
the limited success and complications associated with other forms of assis-
tance and support (Ottaway and Carothers 2000). Channelling aid through 
NGOs and prioritizing civil society as a development strategy has consider-
able appeal for donors: Apart from pandering to liberal and neo-liberal 
concerns about checking the power of the state and holding governing 
elites to account, it is relatively cost-effective; NGOs often deliver projects 
and services cheaply and efficiently, and they tend to be non-bureaucratic 
and highly professional in their operations. Most importantly, not only 
does such intervention engender broad-based support from across the 
political spectrum within donor states, it also enables donors to circum-
vent resistant political elites (Carothers 2009).
It is this aspect of civil society development assistance that has courted 
most controversy: what purports to be politically significant assistance, 
designed to drive consolidation and genuine regime change, with lofty 
ambitions and loaded with normative overtones (‘democracy,’ ‘civil soci-
ety,’ citizen participation etc.) in practice seems to function as apolitical 
technical support. By side-stepping political elites and prioritizing support 
for ‘soft’ institutions of power (i.e. NGOs) rather than driving institutional 
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reform and challenging ‘hard’ power (corrupt elites, transnational net-
works resistant to democratic reform and liberalization), donors have been 
criticised for ignoring critical disparities in power relations. Carothers 
argues that donors’ tendency to purport that it is indeed possible to bring 
about change and improvement “without grappling with the deep-seated 
interests of the actors involved” (2006: 10) is not just a tacit admission of 
the failure of earlier interventions, but is also plainly wrong in its convic-
tion. In other words, at worst democracy promotion via civil society ignores 
structural realities, fails to address the causes of corruption, anti-demo-
cratic practices and misuse of power; at best, international donor efforts 
resort to framing their intervention in terms of apolitical technical assis-
tance and measuring the impact in the context of the completion of dis-
crete projects rather than an assessment of fundamental shifts in power, 
the formation of new institutions, or the behaviour of elites (Crawford 
2003a; 2003b).
The problem for many commentators is precisely this rather audacious 
conflation of democratic civil society with externally funded professional 
NGOs. Ottaway and Carothers contend that the NGOs favoured by foreign 
donors, including the EU, are “set up along the lines of advocacy NGOs in 
the United States […] with designated management, full-time staff, an 
office, and a charter or statement of mission” (2000: 11). Such NGOs will 
engage governments through US-style advocacy and lobbying, but will not 
themselves seek political office, nor necessarily become embroiled in local 
conflicts and campaign agendas; they will operate above the cut and thrust 
of party politics and above indigenous civil society networks, engaging with 
the latter only incidentally. What this essentially creates is a sense of donor-
funded NGOs pursuing a lesser public interest role, committed to civic val-
ues rather than divisive party politics or the contentious politics of ‘local’ 
civil society. The function of such non-partisan organizations takes on 
additional resonance in post-conflict situations, in which NGOs act as a 
counterbalance to nationalist-ridden party politics (Fagan 2005; McMahon 
2007). Whilst the roles played by NGOs in such contexts are legitimized 
by the international community in terms of ‘civil society,’ these semi- 
professional organizations lack political legitimacy or authority, and act 
primarily as service providers in lieu of the market and the state and as 
distributors and conduits of emergency aid (Fagan 2008).
However plausible this critique may seem, it runs the risk of seriously obfus-
cating the added value that professional NGOs deliver in post-authoritarian 
and regime change contexts. Critics have tended to place far too much 
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emphasis on the participatory or “democratic” deficit, and to ignore the 
potential “behind the scenes” roles that NGOs play in fermenting progres-
sive change and as conduits for new policy formation. The commentary is 
based on an unrealistic notion of what civil society and NGOs themselves 
can be expected to achieve, as well as being too dismissive of what scholars 
see as “apolitical” activities. Although NGOs are often ostensibly involved 
in service provision and do not appear to operate in the fray of politics, 
their community development and education-related activities can help 
stimulate participation and trigger the emergence of coalitions for change. 
Thus, rather than judging NGOs solely in terms of their success in mobiliz-
ing citizens and directly challenging political elites, it is important to value 
what Petrova and Tarrow term their ‘transactional activism,’ which they 
define as “the ties -enduring and temporary– among organized non-state 
actors and between them and political parties, power holders, and other 
institutions” (2007: 79). The extent to which NGOs are capable of interact-
ing with state and other non-state actors in the formulation of new policies 
and the transformation of power is rarely subjected to significant analysis. 
Whilst the new embryonic NGOs may not be terribly successful in generat-
ing participation and mobilizing support in the short term, they may func-
tion as the nuclei of new epistemic communities, or sit at the epicentre of 
new pro-change coalitions; their often undisclosed agency in policy 
debates, however small and apparently insignificant, needs to be at least 
anticipated, not least because it may ultimately be laying the foundations 
for civic participation and the legitimation of NGOs in the future (Bruszt 
and Vedres 2009).
Such an alternative perspective on the role of NGO/CSOs is all the 
more pertinent when the funds that apparently sustain them are being 
rationalised and may even be withdrawn. We are thus forced to consider 
the counterfactual: what would the post-socialist and post-conflict 
states of the region be like without these donor-funded professional 
organi sations? Would progress towards EU accession be even slower? 
Would nationalist elites be even less willing to corded power and engage 
with state-market reform? More importantly, would the international 
com munity have simply disengaged from this region after the end of vio-
lence, and how would this have impacted on the reintegration of the 
region into transnational and global networks? In other words, if not 
funding NGOs, what presence, if any, would the international commu-
nity have had?
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Research Methodology and Design
The research sets out to address the following core questions:
(i)  How do the donors that operate across the Western Balkans under-
stand ‘civil society development’?
(ii)  How do donors view the strengths and weaknesses of the civil soci-
ety sector, and the impact of their interventions?
(iii) What do donors prioritize in terms of support and assistance?
(iv) What are the preferred mechanisms for delivering support?
(v) Does co-ordination take place, informally if not formally?
Since there is no reliable, up-to-date and complete directory of interna-
tional donors involved in the region, the first task was to establish a data-
base of multilateral, bilateral and private foundations active in the region 
during the 2010-2011 financial year.2 This was compiled from various exist-
ing lists and databases maintained by the large donors and international 
agencies operating regionally and in individual countries.
In terms of identifying and categorising potential respondents, the first 
distinction to be made was between those donors focusing on specific 
countries, and those engaged across the region. Donors were deemed to be 
focusing on a particular country if there was a country-based office, or a 
country ‘desk’ within the organisation, and were deemed to be operating 
‘regionally’ if there was one office covering the whole region, either within 
or outside the Western Balkans. Supra-national or intergovernmental insti-
tutions were defined to be multilateral (e.g. World Bank, UN, EU); and gov-
ernmental development agencies and embassies were defined as bilateral 
(e.g. SIDA, Dutch Embassy in Skopje). For the purposes of this research, 
private foundations were defined either as trusts, charities or endowments 
(e.g. German Marshall Fund).
As part of an initial scoping exercise, a questionnaire3 was created and 
distributed to 62 multilateral agencies, 57 agencies that were bilateral 
development agencies, 78 private foundations, and two pooled donors 
(i.e. the Balkan Trust for Democracy and the European Fund for the 
2) This was undertaken by the Balkan Civil Society Development Network (BCSDN), my 
research partner in the region.
3) <http://www.ecobhas.qmul.ac.uk/BCSDN/donorquestionnairebtdproject.html>.
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Balkans). For the final list of agencies contacted, the initial database was 
narrowed to 71 priority donors, of which there were 32 completed ques-
tionnaires. There were 16 additional responses from other organisations 
contacted by the research team, bringing the total number of responses to 
48 (see full list in Annex 1) – which is a response rate of 37 percent. However, 
the sample included private, bilateral, and multilateral donors active in the 
countries targeted by the research, which provides a good spread of respon-
dents for the analysis. The final response rate reflects the following:
 • Several organisations claiming that they did not have the sufficient
time and resources to complete the survey;
 • privatedonorsandtwomulti-lateraldonorsindicatingthatalthough
they were involved in civil society development, they no longer did so 
in the Western Balkans;
 • organisationscontactingtheresearchteamtoindicatethattheywould
not participate in the study since their activities were based around 
certain programmatic areas, or that they did not consider their organ-
isation to be a ‘donor’ or to be engaged in donor activities.
A final observation about the data collection process is that it was difficult 
to reconstruct any characteristics of the civil society development strate-
gies of donor organisations that had ceased their operations, even if the 
departure was relatively recent (i.e. within the previous 12 months). 
For example, we were unable to obtain any information from the GTZ 
(the bilateral German development agency) office in Albania, even though 
it had closed only in January 2011. Similarly, DFID (the UK bilateral develop-
ment agency) – which was a key donor in Bosnia in the immediate after-
math of the war, as well as across the region generally – has scaled back its 
operations significantly, to the extent that it only has one functioning office 
in the region (Pristina). Similarly, it proved very difficult to access precise 
information on activities and the substantive nature of DFID activities, 
despite their prominence in the region since the mid-1990s. It is also impor-
tant to explain why there is an absence of data on Croatia. As a result of 
impending EU membership, progress in political and social development, 
and donor priorities having shifted to other parts of the world, many of the 
multilateral donors that were active in the country until recently have now 
left, and those that remain are scaling down their activities dramatically. 
It was therefore decided not to include Croatia in the study, other than as 
part of regional initiatives by donors operating across the Western Balkans. 
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Although there were responses from donors active within each country 
in the region, response rates varied significantly and there was no strati-
fication by country, making it difficult to undertake any cross-country 
comparisons.
For the next phase of the research, and in light of the aforementioned 
difficulties with collecting survey data and with response rates, the research 
team decided to identify and focus on a number of ‘priority’ multilateral 
donors: UNDP, OSCE, DG Enlargement (including the EU Delegation offices 
in each country), and the World Bank. The priority donors also included the 
bilateral development agencies that have been most visible in the region, 
including USAID (USA), SIDA (Sweden), and GTZ (Germany). There were 
also a number of high-profile private foundations on the priority list, 
including OSI/OSF (Open Society Institute/Foundation). The data from the 
responses will be analysed in the next section.
The questionnaire included several open-ended items so that narrative 
data were also collected from each of the respondents regarding their civil 
society development practices.
Preliminary Survey Results
The 48 respondents were based in each of the countries in the region, as well 
as offices in EU member states and the US. Not surprisingly, the start of the 
involvement for most of the local offices and regional programmes in the 
Western Balkans began some time between 1991 and 1996 for most donor 
organisations that completed the survey, which coincides with the dissolu-
tion of Yugoslavia and the various conflicts in the region during this time.
For the reasons outlined above, there were no responses from Croatia. 
There were only two responses for Kosovo (both major bilateral donors), 
two for Montenegro (both major multi-lateral donors), five for Macedonia, 
six for Serbia, and seven each for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania. The 
remainder of the responses (n = 19) came from offices that focused more 
broadly on the region. The results are shown in Table A: Of the respondents, 
19 were private foundations, 16 were bilateral development agencies, and 
the remaining 13 were international or multi-lateral organisations.
There is quite a strong regional consensus on the identification of the 
single most important donor in the Western Balkans: of the 45 responses 
to the question of ranking donors, 35 identified either the European Com-
mission or European Union as most important. Interestingly, four of the 
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respondents, including both bilateral donor country offices in Kosovo, 
replied that USAID was the most important donor. However, three of these 
respondents then placed the EC/EU as the second-most important donor. 
Seventeen of the responses identified USAID or other US governmental 
bilateral donors as the second-most important donor in the region.
(i) Types of funding provided
As highlighted in previous studies on donor activities in the Western 
Balkans and donor-driven development more generally, international 
donors providing financial assistance tend to do so using competitive calls 
for proposals for project grants typically lasting 12-24 months. Although 
several commentaries (e.g. Wedel 2001) have long indicated that such strat-
egies are ineffective and create project administration capacities instead of 
competencies directly related to long-term civil society development, over 
80 percent of the respondents to the questionnaire reported that they pro-
vide short-term project grants. The second most prevalent type of financial 
assistance was regional/cross-national funding, which, in a region of new, 
often weak and fragile states with porous borders, suggests a commitment 
on behalf of donors to build transnational ties and to secure knowledge 
networks and capacities across the region rather than just within individ-
ual states. It also perhaps suggests that donors recognise the importance 
of building transactional activism capacities. The term transactional is used 
as defined by Petrova and Tarrow (2007: 79), referring to building ‘ties—
enduring and temporary— among organised non-state actors and between 
them and political parties, power holders, and other institutions’.
Nearly 30 percent of the sample funded service contracts and tenders 
(though it was not indicated whether this assistance was targeting private 
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companies or CSOs). Only 26 percent of the respondents provided long-
term core funding to recipients not tied to particular projects, or what was 
described as ‘programme funding’ for an extended period (e.g. five years). 
Of additional responses supplied by donors that were not included in the 
survey question, one organisation provided CSOs with funding as imple-
menting partners for the donor’s regional projects; another channelled 
funds through various CSOs as a re-granting mechanism (i.e. trained the 
organisations to act as local donors).
If the sample is divided by donor type (i.e. whether the respondent is 
from a multilateral, bilateral or private agency), the lack of core funding, 
particularly from multilateral donors, is evident, whilst around one-third of 
the other donor types provided financial assistance not linked to specific 
projects. On the other hand, nearly half of the multilateral respondents 
offered service contracts, which was significantly higher than the propor-
tion for private and bilateral donors. The results are presented in Figure B.
(ii) Activities and funding strategies
The focus on strategies to build networking or transactional capacities is 
































Figure B. What types of funding do you provide (by donor type)?
NOTE: Respondents could select as many as they felt were relevant.
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donors support. Over 80 percent of the respondents were funding network 
building activities, and over 85 percent provided support for activities 
relating to building stronger engagement between CSOs and governmental 
institutions, i.e. policy advocacy. However, the most popular activity funded 
by donors remains more basic, fundamental training and capacity building 
for CSOs in the target countries. Some of the respondents also identified 
“other” areas, such as media training, cultural activities, and watchdog 
activities.
In line with the findings in Figure B, multilateral donors were most likely 
to fund activities relating to service provision compared to their bilateral 
and private donor counterparts. Interestingly, bilateral donor respondents 
did not support educational activities as much as other types of donors. 
Amongst the different respondent types (bilateral, multilateral and private 
foundations) there were quite similar levels of support for the three other 
categories (training, networking, and policy advocacy). The results are 
shown in Figure C.
(iii) Co-operation and interaction between donors
Co-operation and networking between and amongst donors occurs: 
Approximately 60 percent of respondents have regular contact with 





























Figure C. Which of the following activities have you funded (by donor type)?
NOTE: Respondents could select as many as they felt were relevant. (n = 48)
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contact with others, but not regularly, was high (40 percent). The propor-
tion of donors who do not co-operate with other agencies is reassuringly 
very small (less than 2 percent); those that co-operate on a daily basis is also 
small (approximately 4 percent).
Overall, respondents indicated a moderate amount of interaction with 
other donors working on the Western Balkans, with none admitting that 
they have ‘no idea what other donors are doing.’ However, only 34 percent 
work closely with other donors, whilst a majority of respondents (over 60 
percent) have some knowledge about the activities of other donors in the 
country and in the region, but do not have a direct, structured relationship.
If the data are now examined for the different types of donors, the pro-
portion in the sample working closely with other donors is slightly higher 
for bilateral donors, whereas a slightly higher proportion of multilateral 
donors have a good idea of what others are doing. This may be evidence of 
differences between multilateral and bilateral donors in the way each views 
and implements inter-donor coordination (multilaterals are likely to find it 
easier to work and co-operate with other multilaterals, whereas bilateral 
donors are wedded to states and national budgets, and therefore less likely 
to engage with others). Private donors, compared with governmental and 
multilateral institutions, have less overall capacity, and higher proportions 
of these respondents either know only roughly, or do not know at all the 
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Figure D. How would you describe your relationship with other donors (by donor type)? 
(n = 47)
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Perceptions about inter-donor co-ordination also seem to vary bet-
ween  representatives from regional offices compared to those working 
at the country level: Amongst respondents in the study from country 
offices, a higher proportion believed that donors work closely together, 
compared to their counterparts working in regional donor offices, who 
have a good idea of what others are doing, but not how the interaction 
takes place. This may be explained in terms of the former’s proximity to 
the delivery of projects on the ground and the day-to-day realities of 
working in a particular country, compared to strategic planning across the 
region.
(iv) Funding priorities
Regarding the specific topics that were prioritized by the donors 
that responded to the questionnaire, most view the development of capa-
cities through training and technical assistance as being of paramount 
importance. Democracy building and citizen participation receive a 
similar level of focus as funding priorities. Due to the compound legacies 
of conflict (with the exception of Albania or Macedonia) and the author-
itarian past, the topic of marginalised groups (including displaced 
persons) was also indicated by two-thirds of the sample as a main funding 
priority. Respondents also identified other priorities not included in 
the survey question, such as local development (including rural develop-
ment), justice, gender/women’s issues, and transnational co-operation. 
What this indicates is that donors continue to address fundamental 
issues of social and economic reconstruction, whilst post-materialist 
concerns, such as the environment and nature protection, are of much less 
importance.
If these priorities are now divided by donor type, multilateral respon-
dents supported environmental protection more than other types of 
donors. Private foundations seem to focus slightly less on capacity building 
compared to the others, which could be a function of lower capacities to 
implement such programmes. Although the level of support for marginal-
ized groups as a priority seems higher for multilateral respondents, many of 
the ‘other’ responses (listed by bilateral and private foundations) men-
tioned women’s issues and justice, and so the difference between the three 
types of donors is not quite as pronounced as it appears. The results are 
shown in Figure E.
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(v) Agenda setting, co-ordination and planning
Donor priorities are determined, for the most part, by offices located in the 
region, or through a dialogue between the headquarters outside the 
Western Balkans and the country office. Of the five respondents who indi-
cated other mechanisms for determining development strategies, three 
rely on a board or steering committee; one respondent mentioned a joint 
decision-making process between the donor and local partners; and one 
donor programme office based in the region sets priorities with the head-
quarters of the bilateral development agency. Just over 25 percent of the 
respondents revealed that priorities are set by the head office. The results 
are presented in Figure F.
If the responses are now divided by donor type, priorities are developed 
by the country office in similar proportions. There are differences with the 
private foundations, but this could be due to the fact that many of the foun-
dations that participated in the survey have headquarters offices outside 
the region, but do not necessarily have country offices.
Country-focused and regional respondents answered differently regard-
ing where priorities are set for civil society development. Not surprisingly, 
perhaps, respondents from regional offices believed that the headquarters/
% Multilateral
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Figure E. What are your main funding priorities? (Divided by donor type)
NOTE: Respondents could select as many as they felt were relevant. (n = 48)
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regional office set the priorities more often than the country offices. How-
ever, by contrast, officials working at the country offices and country desks 
who replied to the survey largely believed that the agenda for civil society 
was set evenly by regional/headquarter offices and the country offices/
desks. Regional offices exist, by and large, to plan and develop regional 
strategies.
(vi) Donors and CSOs – patterns of interaction and perceptions
The analysis will now turn to the interaction between the international 
donor organisations and local CSOs. There were only three respondents 
who said that civil society was effective in the region, and no responses 
recording that civil society is non-existent. The remainder of the responses 
preferred more intermediate options about the state of civil society: the 
most popular response (73 percent) was that civil society was donor-
dependent, but that it can represent interests; more worryingly, nearly two-
thirds of the survey responses (63 percent) noted that civil society is 
unevenly developed and unsustainable. Of the respondents that provided 
“other” responses, two mentioned that the civil society sector is divided 

















Figure F. Who leads the development of priorities and funding in your donor organization? 
(n = 47)
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constantly evolving and beginning to engage with governmental institu-
tions in some places; and one respondent mentioned that the situation var-
ies significantly amongst countries in the region.
Although none of the respondents chose the most pessimistic option, 
over a quarter of the private donor respondents believed that civil society is 
very weak, with lower proportions for the other types of donors. However, 
private foundation respondents were generally more positive than other 
types of donors, with nearly 90 percent answering that ‘civil society requires 
support from donors, but is able to function and represent interests’, and 
around 16 percent agreeing that ‘civil society is effective.’
This may be explained by the fact that private foundations (as opposed 
to multilateral or bilateral donors) deliver relatively modest amounts of 
funding to a small pool of local CSOs, whom they get to know well and work 
with closely, usually over a longer period of time; whereas they may know 
the CSOs with whom they work particularly well, they may have a less 
extensive knowledge of the civil society at large. Moreover, private founda-
tions usually are the only donors offering longer-term core funding (see 
Figure B2 above), and this is perhaps key to understanding why they iden-
tify uneven development and express a concern about the sustainability of 
civil society (which relies heavily on the core funding they provide), but 
equally acknowledge that civil society is able to ‘function and represent 
interests’. The results are shown in Table G.
Regarding the CSOs within these countries (as opposed to civil society 
generally), almost all (90 percent) of the donors that participated in the 
research noted that local organisations were dependent on donors. Half of 
the donors said that CSOs function but lack capacity, whilst over 60 per-
cent had a more positive evaluation, believing that CSOs are developing 
and gaining influence. Donors providing “other” responses also noted that 
CSOs needed to spend more time fostering relationships with local com-
munities and governmental institutions instead of pursuing donor priori-
ties. However, it is difficult to make generalizations across the region: 
several respondents also wrote that the situation varies greatly in the 
region, depending on the donor presence and CSO-governmental relations. 
The results are presented in Figure J.
Private donors in the survey sample also seem more positive towards 
CSOs, with nearly a quarter of respondents believing that local CSOs 
are effective and have capacity. The responses to this question were 
consistent across the options, except for a lower proportion of bilateral 
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donor respondents believing that CSOs function but lack capacity 
compared to multilateral and private donors. The results are shown in 
Figure H.
Respondents to the questionnaire refrained from giving overly negative 
opinions about their interaction with local CSO partners in the Western 
Balkans, with none of the responses reflecting opinions about ‘a lot of 
work remaining to be done,’ lack of effective co-operation, or contempla-
tion of leaving the country/region. Of the remaining options, donors in the 
sample did indicate that there was a partnership, but less than 30 percent 
said that CSOs are proactive and take initiative in designing/proposing 
activities. In other words, there may be a partnership, but it is one that is 
still led largely by the international agencies. The results are presented 
in Table I.
If the responses are divided by donor type, private foundation respon-
dents to the questionnaire see their interaction with local CSOs more as a 
partnership, with 68 percent choosing this option, versus lower percent-
ages for the other types of donors. Again, this may well be explained in 
Table G. How would you describe civil society in the region? (Divided by 
donor type)
Multilateral Bilateral Private
n percent n percent n percent
Civil society does not exist or 
function in the country/
region in which we operate
0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Civil society exists, but is 
very weak and undeveloped
1 7.69 1 6.25 5 26.32
Civil society exists,  
but is unevenly developed 
and unsustainable
8 61.54 8 50.00 14 73.68
Civil society is weak  
but becoming stronger
5 38.46 7 43.75 7 36.84
Civil society requires support 
from donors, but is able to 
function and represent 
interests
9 69.23 9 56.25 17 89.47
Civil society is effective 0 0.00 0 0.00 3 15.79
Other 2 15.38 2 12.50 2 10.53
NOTE: Respondents could select as many as they felt were relevant (n = 48)
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Figure H. How would you evaluate CSOs in the country / region? (Divided by donor type)
NOTE: Respondents could select as many as they felt were relevant (n = 48).
terms of private foundations having a closer and longer-term interaction 
with a narrow band of CSOs. However, private donors also seemed to indi-
cate that their local partners were not proactive in initiating proposals, 
whilst 40 percent of the respondents from bilateral donors believed that 
local CSOs shaped their projects and activities.
There was also an observed difference in perceptions about local 
CSOs between country-based donors and those working at a regional level. 
Only one response from the latter category believed that local CSOs are 
Table I.  How would you describe your relationship with the organisations 
you support? (n = 47)
Response Freq percent
It is a partnership - they appreciate our assistance and we 
work well together
26 55.32
They are learning to work in partnership with us and to 
deliver what we want and expect
7 14.89
They take initiative in proposing projects/activities which  
we then support
14 29.79
There is still a lot of work to be done 0 0.00
We do not co-operate effectively 0 0.00
We are contemplating ending our involvement 0 0.00
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learning to work in partnership, whilst nearly a quarter of the replies from 
country offices/desks selected this option. Again, this apparent discrep-
ancy in perceptions may be explained in terms of those donors working 
within individual countries engaging more closely with local CSO networks 
and having a more nuanced sense of emerging partnerships.
Nonetheless, the donors seem largely to have a positive opinion overall 
about the capacities of the CSOs with which they work. Less than 30 per-
cent of the respondents worked with small organisations with low levels of 
capacity, whilst over three-quarters of the donors that participated in the 
research reported that they worked with small and medium-sized organ-
isations (one of the ‘other’ responses wrote that there are also small organ-
isations with developing expertise and capacities), and over 60 percent of 
the respondents wrote that the local CSOs with which they worked are 
professional.
These findings can suggest one of two things: either that the existing 
scholarly assessment of local CSOs in the Western Balkans has been overly 
pessimistic and that the level of capacities is not as bad as widely reported, 
or that only CSOs with developed capacities interact with international 
donors. In other words, the smaller local organisations with low or moderate 
capacities are either excluded from the orbit of donor funding, or are 
increasingly marginalized by the process of allocation.
There is some evidence that the major donors in the region tend to build 
and bolster organisations with existing capacities, instead of supporting 
smaller CSOs. This is evidenced by the fact that only 15 percent of the mul-
tilateral respondents worked with smaller CSOs, whilst over one-third 
of the private foundation donors in the sample did so. But it is not necessar-
ily the case that donors only work with the most successful CSOs. Indeed, 
the interview data reveal that multilateral donors seem to work less with 
organisations that lead networks, favouring instead a tier of mid-ranking 
successful ‘client’ organisations that succeed in obtaining project funding 
in each project round, but remain dependent on donors. This corroborates 
the earlier finding that multilateral donors, more than other types of 
donors, are more inclined to provide funding for the provision of services 
rather than political advocacy. All of the private foundation donors in the 
questionnaire sample worked with medium-sized organisations, and 
nearly 60 percent worked with CSOs that led networks. This suggests that 
the private foundations focus more on working with local CSOs and CSO 
networks compared to their multilateral and bilateral counterparts. This 
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may mean that governmental and multilateral agencies neglect smaller 
CSOs and networks, or more positively, that the approaches by private and 
other types of donors in the Western Balkans complement each other. The 
results are shown in Figure J.
Unsurprisingly, as with the other questions in the survey, respondents 
did not select the most negative or pessimistic options. For donor impact, 
there were no responses for the option that their involvement has been ‘a 
waste of time and money’, and only one donor replied that donors had not 
helped civil society development. On the other hand, 39 percent of the par-
ticipants believed that civil society would not exist without donors, though 
35 percent of the respondents believed that support could have been used 
more effectively. Nearly one-third of the respondents had a positive view of 
donor impact, i.e. that funding created professional CSOs and that donor 
support has created sustainable civil society. The most popular answers 
were more cautiously positive, with 67 percent of respondents replying 
that donors had strengthened civil society on the whole and that donors 
have created leading CSOs (though not throughout the sector). Similarly, 
participants in the survey replied that donors had created professional 
individuals in civil society, but had not developed the whole sector. 
































Figure J. How would you describe the organisation(s) with whom you work? (Divided by 
donor type)
NOTE: Respondents could select as many as they felt were relevant.
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4) Respondents completed the questionnaire with the proviso that their answers would be 
anonymous. Thus, attributions in this section only refer to the donor type and country of 
operation.
Table K. How would you describe the impact of donor funding in the 
country / region?
Response n per cent
Donor funding has strengthened civil society generally 31 67.39
Donor funding has created several leading and professional  
CSOs and not the whole sector
31 67.39
Donor funding has created professional individuals/experts  
in CSD and not the whole sector
21 45.65
Civil society would not exist without donors 18 39.13
Donors could have used their resources more effectively 16 34.78
Donor funding has created professional CSOs 15 32.61
Donor funding has built capacities and helped create  
sustainable civil society
15 32.61
Donor funding has not helped to build civil society 1 2.17
Donor funding has weakened civil society 1 2.17
Donor funding has been a waste of time and money 0 0
NOTE: Respondents could select as many as they felt were relevant (n = 46). Responses have 
been sorted with the most popular options listed first.
Identifying Problems with Civil Society Development4
There seemed to be a broad consensus amongst the donor organisations 
across the region about the problems facing CSOs and civil society develop-
ment in the Western Balkans. The concerns raised are also familiar criti-
cisms levelled at NGOs and externally funded civil society development 
globally. The main concern expressed by several donors was dependency: 
One of the private foundations referred to civil society as ‘project society,’ 
since the survival of CSOs depends on continuing short-term grants to 
retain staff and to complete projects. According to another foundation 
operating in the region, donor priorities steer the activities of CSOs, so local 
organisations focus more on chasing international money rather than 
focusing on their core activities. A side effect of this is that CSOs, instead 
of working together on issues of common concern and expertise, find 
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themselves in competition with each other, creating a weakened civil 
society voice in the country and in the region. A large bilateral donor based 
in Kosovo noted that competition amongst local CSOs has diluted their 
potential power. One of the bilateral European development agencies 
active in Bosnia-Herzegovina pointed out that this project-driven strategy 
has also weakened long-term governance-building, since capacity building 
has been driven by donors, not by the countries themselves, resulting in 
weak co-ordination and co-operation between state and non-state actors. 
More importantly, by pursuing donor initiatives instead of listening to the 
needs of citizens, CSOs have become unaccountable, and according to one 
regional foundation, CSOs in the Western Balkans suffer from an ‘inability 
to genuinely blend with the society’. In Albania, one of the country offices 
for a bilateral development agency stressed the need for better internal 
accountability and transparency amongst CSOs, since many have non-
member decision-making processes.
Other respondents also indicated that the financial weakness leaves 
CSOs vulnerable to politicization or marginalization by political parties, 
especially since donors are gradually shifting their priorities to other parts 
of the world and are leaving the Western Balkans. One of the large bilateral 
development agencies active in Bosnia-Herzegovina noted that there are 
no alternative revenue streams for CSOs, since governmental assistance is 
given in an unaccountable and non-transparent way, and the business sec-
tor does not as yet see CSOs as potential partners. Due to the lack of long-
term certainty, CSOs are often dependent on political parties and may 
become interwoven with party political interests and agendas, as pointed 
out by a private foundation active in Serbia. In Macedonia, one bilateral 
development agency noted that local organisations are reluctant to speak 
out against the government. One of the multilateral agencies in Albania 
also identified political independence as a problem with CSOs in the coun-
try. Another related problem associated with the weakness of CSOs and low 
sustainability is that there is a high turnover of staff and thus, there is no 
accumulation of expertise. The high turnover of CSO staff was noted by an 
international organisation working in Bosnia-Herzegovina and by a 
European bilateral development agency working in Kosovo.
Since respondents to the questionnaire identified USAID and the EU as 
the two most important donors in the Western Balkans, it is instructive to 
briefly examine the problems for CSO development identified by represen-
tatives of the two donors. The responses of USAID and EU representatives 
across the region seem mostly to identify the same sets of problems, 
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although one EU representative identified the uneven development of 
CSOs, and USAID respondents identified the lack of CSO-business partner-
ships and inter-CSO competition, as significant obstacles to CSO develop-
ment in the Western Balkans. The results are shown in Table L.
Discussion and Conclusion
Despite the aforementioned limitations of the survey data, the research has 
provided a significant amount of information about past and present donor 
activities, perceptions of the capacities of recipients, attitudes of donors 
towards CSO/NGOs, levels of co-ordination amongst donors and insights 
into internal evaluations regarding successes and failures of the commit-
ments made.
In terms of donor understanding of civil society, its function and devel-
opment, the over-riding perception is of CSOs as service providers, partners 
for projects, and sources of potential knowledge and expertise. Although 
most donors identified the importance of engaging local and smaller organ-
isations rather than just working with large, well-established organisations 
or networks, the vast majority also emphasised the importance of engaging 
CSOs with governmental or multilateral agencies, as well as the importance 
of network building. This suggests that there is at least a recognition of the 
bifurcated role of civil society, as a facet of pluralist and participatory 
Table L.  Main problems with CSOs identified by one or more respon-
dents, for USAID and the EU.
EU USAID
Lack of sustainability X X
Unevenly developed X
No financial autonomy X X
No social responsibility or civic engagement X X
Lack of transparency regarding public sources of funding X X
Dependence on donor funding X X
Lack of trust from citizens X X
Lack of capacities (technical, knowledge, fundraising, etc.) X X
Lack of political independence X X
CSOs and the business sector are not in partnership X
CSOs compete amongst themselves, and do not co-operate X
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democracy, and as transactional partners in policy making and governance. 
From the narrative responses of self-selected examples of best practice, 
donors, whether a large bilateral/multilateral agency or a private founda-
tion, identified either developing basic and participatory capacities, or 
building local, national and/or regional networks that include CSOs as 
examples of successful practice.
In terms of the proportions of aid deployed towards supporting particu-
lar activities or building certain capacities, providing training and technical 
assistance is the main focus. Indeed, almost all of the respondents have 
provided CSO training and/or technical assistance. But donors also seem to 
focus heavily on network-building and advocacy activities. This confirms 
research conducted in parts of the Western Balkans and in post-socialist 
Central and Eastern Europe showing that instead of simply funding direct 
action or participatory projects, international donors have tended to 
prioritise transactional activities, or activities that promote stronger links 
(domestically and regionally) between governmental and non-governmental 
actors, and amongst non-governmental actors.
The mechanisms for delivering support are identified in the existing 
literature as critical determinants of the sustainability of outcomes and 
the types of CSOs that emerge and thrive. It is therefore quite surprising 
that, despite the criticism levelled at short-term project grants as a devel-
opment tool for civil society, most donors (80 percent) still channel their 
assistance predominantly or entirely through grants for projects typically 
lasting for 24 months or less (Figure B). By contrast, long-term core or pro-
gramme funding, which most of the larger CSOs in the region have secured, 
is only provided by less than a quarter of the donors that responded to the 
questionnaire.
With regard to the critical issue of co-ordination between donors and 
attempts to co-operate rather than duplicate initiatives, both the question-
naire and the interview data revealed a symmetry in terms of what donors 
prioritise and focus on (even if they employ different strategies and 
approaches), but a somewhat alarming lack of informal or formal co- 
operation and regular communication.
In terms of the triadic relationship between donors, CSOs and local 
stakeholders, the results (Table K) suggest that most respondents believe 
that there is a partnership between local CSOs and donors which works 
well. However, if the regional and country offices are analysed separately, 
a larger proportion of international actors believe that local CSOs are 
still learning to become effective partners, whilst only one regional office 
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representative chose this option. Less than one-third of the donors that 
completed the questionnaire believed that CSOs were taking a proactive 
role in setting programme priorities (Table K), which indicates that most 
CSOs are not involved in activities such as programme design and evalua-
tion. Although respondents avoided selecting the most pessimistic options 
regarding existing CSO capacities, the results from Figure H and Figure J 
suggest that donors are aware of the dependence of local organisations on 
funding and other assistance from international sources.
In terms of relating the data presented here to the fundamental question 
of why the long-term provision of aid and attempts to promote democracy 
via civil society have seemingly not delivered a sufficient dividend, the 
problem seems to lie more in the mechanisms donors deploy rather than 
their understanding of the role and function of civil society. The domi-
nance of short-term project grants is seemingly unabated; although there 
is a recognition that networking and building ‘transactional’ capacities 
are important, this requires a different approach in terms of deploying 
resources over a longer-term basis and towards less tangible outcomes.
Whilst it is fair to conclude that how donors view civil society and its 
contribution to democracy and state building is the basis on which the 
focus of aid is decided, there is seemingly a disconnect between percep-
tions of what needs to be done and how to achieve it. Combined with poor 
co-ordination and collaboration amongst donors, the limited impact of 
donor strategies is explicable. The overriding sense from the interview data 
is that the provision of aid, the setting of agendas and the evaluation of 
outcomes takes place in a context of imperfect knowledge.
Whilst it has long been recognised that donor strategies are contentious 
and determine the impact of assistance, this article has extended our 
understanding of how donors are responding and whether that response is 
sufficient to mitigate the predicted impact of reduced budgets and ratio-
nalisation in a region still very much in need of development aid.
Annex 1: List of respondents
DFID (Kosovo)
ERSTE Foundation
EU Delegation to Albania
EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina
EU Delegation to Montenegro
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EU Delegation to Serbia
European Commission, DG Enlargement
European Cultural Foundation
European Fund for the Balkans
Fondacija tuzlanske zajednice
Foundation Open Society (Albania)
Foundation Open Society (Macedonia)
Foundation Open Society (Serbia)





National Endowment for Democracy
OSCE Mission to Montenegro
OSCE Mission to Macedonia
Oak Foundation
Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency - SIDA 
(Headquarters)
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency - SIDA (Albania)
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency - SIDA (Bosnia- 
Herzegovina)
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency - SIDA (Serbia)
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation - SDC (Albania)
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation - SDC (Bosnia- 
Herzegovina)
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation - SDC (Macedonia)
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation - SDC (Serbia)
Swiss Cultural Programme in the Western Balkans
The German Marshall Fund of the US, The Balkan Trust for Democracy
The Olof Palme International Center (Serbia)
Think Tank Fund - Open Society Foundations












Westminster Foundation for Democracy
The World Bank (Albania)
The World Bank (Macedonia)
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